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Recent Cases

CRIMINAL LAW-PLACE OF CRIME
DETERMINES JURISDICTION
AS WELL AS VENUE

Commonwealth v. Simeone, 222 Pa. Super. 376, 294 A.2d 921 (1972)
In Commonwealth v. Simeone,1 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that the place of occurrence of a criminal act relates
to jurisdiction and not merely to venue. In so holding, the court
reiterates what has long been the law of Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, several interesting problems are suggested by the decision.
In Simeone, Jesse Fantozzi stole a trailer loaded with Sears,
Roebuck & Co. merchandise from a loading dock in Philadelphia.
He drove the trailer to Anthony Simeone's warehouse in neighboring Bucks County. The merchandise was then unloaded by Fantozzi and Simeone into the latter's warehouse, after which Fantozzi transported the empty trailer back into Philadelphia County
and abandoned it on a city street. Fantozzi and Simeone were
subsequently arrested and charged with burglary, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. At the ensuing trial in Philadelphia, before
a judge sitting without a jury, Fantozzi pleaded guilty and Simeone
was acquitted. Both Fantozzi and Simeone were indicted on the
same charges in Bucks County for the incidents occurring there.
Fantozzi's motion to quash the indictment was granted, but Simeone's motion was refused. Thereupon, Fantozzi was called to testify against Simeone which resulted in the latter's conviction.
Simeone appealed the conviction in Bucks County on the ground
that he had been placed in double jeopardy.
1. 222 Pa. Super. 376, 294 A.2d 921 (1972).

It is well established that "former jeopardy does not exist unless the previous trial was before a court of competent jurisdiction,
and a judgment void for lack of jurisdiction. . . is not a bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense."'2 Jurisdiction normally refers to the "judicial power to hear and determine a criminal prosecution, whereas venue relates to and defines the particular
county or territorial area within a state or district in which the
prosecution is to be brought or tried."3 At common law and almost
universally throughout the United States today, the proper venue
of an offense is the county in which the crime was committed. 4
Unlike jurisdiction, the requirement of proper venue may be
waived by the defendant. 5 Applying these principles, Simeone
claimed that the Philadelphia court had jurisdiction and that Philadelphia was merely the improper venue for the trial since he had
received the stolen goods in Bucks County. Thus, if this theory
were adopted, Simeone was placed in jeopardy a second time during the trial in Bucks County and he must be acquitted on appeal.
Judge Packel, writing the majority opinion, found no merit in
this contention, stating:
We do not start with a clean slate. Embedded in the
common law is the proposition that the subject matter
jurisdiction 6 of criminal courts extends only to offenses
7
committed within the county of trial.
The court thus interprets the significance attached by the common
law to the county in which a criminal act occurred as relating to
the court's power to hear the case, and not merely as relating to
the proper place for trial to be brought.
In this regard, the court cites with approval Simmons v. Commonwealths which contains the earliest appellate recognition of
this rule in Pennsylvania. In that case Justice Brackenbridge, dissenting on other grounds, stated the rule as follows:
One county is as distinct from another, as one country
from another, in respect of the right of jurisdiction. Per2. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 244 (1961). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 112 (1973).
3. 21 AM. Jup. 2d Criminal Law § 376 (1965).
4. Id. at § 399.
5. E.g., Commonwealth v. Simeone, 222 Pa. Super. 376, 384, 294 A.2d

921, 925, n.3 (1972) ("[I]t is well settled that while venue may be waived,

jurisdiction may not").
6. This is a somewhat imprecise choice of words. A more accurate
term is "territorial jurisdiction." See Turnbaugh v. Dunlap, 406 Ill. 573,
94 N.E.2d 438, 440 (1950) where the court stated:
The concept of territorial jurisdiction . . . is not to be confused
with that of jurisdiction over the subject matter. The former relates to the power of the tribunal considered with reference to the
territory within which it is to be exercised ....
Jursidiction of
the subject matter, on the other hand, is the power to hear and
determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in
question belongs.
7. 222 Pa. Super. 376, 377-78, 294 A.2d 921, 922 (1972).
8. 5 Binn. 617 (Pa. 1813).
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sonal actions follow the person, and there is a fiction of
the contract being in the county where the person is.
. . . [But] there is no fiction in a criminal case so as to
give jurisdiction. . . . [It is still] a principle 'that the

trial of all causes civil and criminal must be in the very
district where the cause of complaint arose,' 4 Black 411.
Fiction in civil cases

. . .

has dispensed with this as to ac-

tions purely personal, but in criminal never.9
The Simeone court reiterates this principle later in its opinion:
[TIhere is no doubt that the actuality of what our courts
have done is to treat the place of the crime as determining which court has the power to try the offense.10
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania arrived at the same conclusion in Commonwealth v. Mull." There the court held that:
The locus of the crime is always in issue, for the court
has no jurisdiction of the offense unless it occurred within
the county of trial, or unless by some statute it need not.' 2
On this basis, the court ruled that because there was a real question of where the crime had occurred, it was prejudicial error for
the trial judge to refuse the defendant's request to charge the jury
that unless they found the killing to have been committed within
the county they must acquit the defendant. This position was reaffirmed in Commonwealth ex Tel. Chatery v. Nailor13 where a writ
of habeas corpus was granted because the evidence at trial had not
established that the crime had been committed in the county in
which the defendant had been convicted.
The Mull and Mailor rulings, restricting jurisdiction to county
limits, dictate the result in Simeone. Inasmuch as Simeone's previous trial in Philadelphia was for an offense committed outside
Philadelphia County, that court was acting beyond its jurisdiction
and therefore its judgment was void. 14 Because a void judgment
is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, 15
Simeone's trial in Bucks County did not constitute double jeopardy.
The concurring opinion in Simeone offers two alternative
grounds for the decision. In actuality, however, both theories rest
upon the same premise. Judge Hoffman, joined by Judge Spaulding, expressed the questions confronting the court as "(1) whether
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 628-29.
222 Pa. Super. 376, 379, 294 A.2d 921, 922 (1972).
316 Pa. 424, 175 A. 418 (1934).
Id. at 426, 175 A. at 419.
416 Pa. 280, 206 A.2d 43 (1965).
See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
Id.

appellant was tried twice for the same offense, and (2) if so,
whether he was tried by a court of competent jurisdiction in the
first trial."'16 Responding to the first issue, the two judges found
that there were three facts alleged in the Philadelphia and Bucks
County indictments that differed. The first disparity, the date of
the offense, and the second, the ownership of the goods, were considered immaterial variances.1 7 The third difference, however, the
county in which the offense occurred, was found to be material.
The concurring judges reasoned that because jurisdiction is only
county-wide, the evidence required to support conviction on the
Philadelphia County indictment would not be sufficient to sustain
conviction on the Bucks County indictment. Therefore, since this
is the criterion used to determine whether or not offenses are the
same for purposes of double jeopardy,' the offenses were found
to be entirely separate and distinct.
Despite the negative answer to its first inquiry, obviating the
necessity of further analysis, Judge Hoffman nevertheless discussed
the question of the validity of the jurisdiction in Philadelphia
County. Applying once again the principle that territorial jurisdiction in Pennsylvania is only county-wide, the concurring judges
found that even if the two indictments had constituted the same
offense, the Philadelphia court had no power to acquit Simeone
of receiving stolen goods in Bucks County. In support of this proposition, the concurring opinion cites Commonwealth v. Klaiman.19
In that case, the defendant was accused of receiving stolen goods
and the party who sold defendant the goods testified that he had
delivered them to the defendant in Norristown, Montgomery
County. Klaiman denied the allegation and claimed he had received the goods in Chester, Delaware County. The judge instructed
the jury that they could not convict unless they were satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the stolen goods had been received
in Montgomery County. Klaiman was acquitted but the court
stated:
An acquittal, to bar another prosecution, must be in the
county in which the offense was committed. The trial and
acquittal in one county of one charged with a criminal
offense is no bar to an indictment for the same offense in
a different county, unless it appears the offense was
20 committed in the county in which the acquittal was had.
16. 222 Pa. Super. 376, 382, 294 A.2d 921, 924 (1972).
17. The court explained that a difference in dates is a mere formal
defect which is of no significance unless time is of the essence in the
particular case. Similarly, a variance as to the ownership of the goods is
of no consequence as long as it is apparent that the goods alleged to
have been stolen in each indictment are the same. Id. at 383 n.2, 294
A.2d at 924 n.2.
18. E.g., United States v. American Oil Co., 296 F. Supp. 538, 540
(D.N.J. 1969).
19. 46 Pa. D. & C. 585 (Montg. 1941).
20. Id. at 587.
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The Klaiman rationale, adopted by the court in Simeone, was expressed as follows:
[A]n acquittal in a court not having jurisdiction of the offense is not former jeopardy and is 21no bar to subsequent
trial in a court which has jurisdiction.
Despite the logic of, and, under the present status of the law in
Pennsylvania, the inevitability of the Simeone decision, there remain substantial theoretical and practical problems.
The first is suggested by Judge Hoffman's concurring opinion,
in which he quotes the Bucks County trial court as stating:
The verdict in Philadelphia was obviously grounded upon
the fact that there was no evidence to show that the [appellant] in any way participated in the burglary, larceny,
or receiving stolen goods connected with the original theft
of the trailer from the loading dock of Sears, Roebuck.
There is certainly no finding implicit in that verdict that
he was not guilty of the crime of receiving stolen
goods
22
when they were delivered to him in Bucks County.
Because in the Simeone trial in Philadelphia the judge sat without
a jury, it was possible to determine the rationale behind the decision since a trial judge may, in his discretion, make findings of fact
or explain his decision. However, had there been a jury at the
trial, a general verdict of not guilty would have given no clue to
the grounds on which it was predicated. In other words, the jury
might well have been saying by its verdict: (1) the defendant did
not commit the crime in this county, i.e. the venue is improper in
this county; (2) therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction of the offense, i.e. "the inherent power to decide the case; ' 23 and (3) therefore, we must acquit so that the Commonwealth may try the defendant in the proper county. On the other hand, the jury's verdict of not guilty may have been an expression of their finding that
the crime was actually committed within the county, but that the
defendant took no part in it. Thus, it would be impossible to separate the question of guilt from that of venue 24 and the jeopardy
of the jury trial would serve as a complete defense to any further
prosecution.
The most apparent solution to the problem of separating the

question of guilt from the question of venue lies in the use of the
21. Id.
22. 222 Pa. Super. 376, 381, 294 A.2d 921, 923-24 (1972).
23. Southern Sand & Gravel Co. v. Massaponax Sand & Gravel
Corp., 145 Va. 317, 13 S.E. 812, 813 (1926).
24. "Venue" is used here to mean the locality, more particularly the
county, in which the criminal acts are alleged to have occurred.

special verdict, which, however, may not be permitted in Pennsylvania. If special verdicts were to be used, the reason for acquittal would be ascertainable in a jury trial as well as in a nonjury trial and the problem would be obviated. The feasibility of
this approach is demonstrated in Klaiman.2 5 There the court instructed the jury that if they found that the stolen goods were not
received in Montgomery County, the county of trial, then they
should bring in a verdict of "not guilty because of lack of jurisdiction. '26 The jury did bring in this verdict. The question raised
in the ensuing motion for a new trial was whether this was a special verdict and, if so, whether it was valid. Doubt was expressed
by the court as to whether it was technically a special verdict or
simply an explanation of the general verdict of "not guilty." The
court asserted that on rare occasions special verdicts have been
held proper 27 and therefore, even if considered special, the ver28
dict was acceptable.
A second interesting consideration is presented by the circumstances that result when venue is treated as a jurisdictional fact.
In such a situation, after hearing the case, the jury will decide as a
question of fact whether or not the court had the judicial power
to determine the specific criminal prosecution it has just determined. Moreover, the jury fulfills this function merely by deciding whether or not the act occurred within some arbitrarily defined geographical bounds.
A realization that geographical subdivisions within a sovereign state are of no significance to the substantive rights of the
defendant leads to the major criticism of the proposition advanced
in Simeone. Under Simeone a defendant who is guilty of a criminal offense may nevertheless escape punishment simply because
the locus of the crime is in question. If the jury rendered a general
verdict of not guilty based on an unexpressed finding of lack of
jurisdiction, double jeopardy would attach to and prevent any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. An examination of the
25. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra.
26. 46 Pa. D. & C. 585, 586 (Montg. 1941) (emphasis added).
27. Commonwealth v. Eichelberger, 119 Pa. 254, 13 A. 422 (1888);
Commonwealth v. Chathams, 50 Pa. 181, 88 Am. Dec. 539 (1864); Commonwealth v. Channing, 55 Pa. Super. 510 (1914).
28. Whether the special verdict is indeed valid under Pennsylvania
law is beyond the scope of this Note. The troublesome question, however,
may not lie so much with the validity of verdicts such as "not guilty
because of lack of jurisdiction" as with determining whether such verdicts
actually constitute special verdicts. In Pentz, Special Findings or Special Verdicts, 60 DICK. L. REv. 67 (1955), it is stated:
Much of the difficulty in the past has arisen from the failure to
distinguish between a special verdict, and special findings.
In a special verdict, the jury finds all the facts in the case, disputed as well as undisputed, and leaves the ultimate decision on
those facts to the Court. Special findings accompany a general
verdict, and serve as an aid in clarifying the facts and issues
which are disposed of by the general verdict.

566
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common 29law provides an explanation for what is today dubious
doctrine.
In the early days of English jurisprudence, the jurors themselves were the witnesses and rendered their verdict based on their
personal knowledge. Thus, it was thought that the most qualified jurors would be those summoned from the neighborhood of
the place where the criminal act on trial took place. This resulted
in the rule that criminal offenses were subject to prosecution only
in the county where committed. As the jury system evolved, the
jurors were no longer witnesses themselves, but were required to
hear evidence presented by other witnesses. However, it was still
deemed important that the jurors be from the neighborhood inasmuch as they would be most likely to know the character of the
accused and therefore better able to determine the truth. Of
course, this theory rested upon the assumption that any offense
a person might commit was apt to take place in his own locality.
This may have been a valid assumption in the early days of English
jurisprudence; however, in today's mobile society it is no longer
sound. Nevertheless, the proposition that a person accused of a
criminal offense must be tried by a jury of the visne, "which,
though originally more limited, came to be understood to be the
county where the offense was committed,"30 has anachronistically
survived. 1
It is important to distinguish this proposition from the one
embraced in the Pennsylvania constitution. It is stated therein
that "[i] n all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right to...
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the vicinage. ...
Two things should be noted concerning this clause: first, the
33
constitution employs the word "vicinage" -not county; and second, the constitution bestows a right in the accused-it does not
mandate that the prosecution take place in any given place. With
respect to the former, it has been held that the term "vicinage"
does not require that the trial take place in the county where the

29. See State v. Brown, 103 Vt. 312, 154 A. 579 (1931) and authorities
therein cited, from which much of the historical material in the text has
been drawn.
30. Id. at 314, 154 A. at 580.
31. The court further states: "Indeed, the rule was formerly so imperative that if an offense was committed partly in one county and partly
in another, the offender was not punishable at all." Id.
32.

PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.

33. As originally enacted in 1784, this provision contained the word
"country." It was changed to "vicinage" in 1790. See State v. Brown,
103 Vt. 312, 154 A. 579, 581 (1931).

crime actually occurred.3 4 With respect to the latter, it must be
realized that the framers of the constitution used this language
to insure the fairest possible trial to those accused of criminal offenses.3 5 In an attempt to achieve this goal, they entitled the accused to be tried before a jury of the vicinage. But, there is every
reason to believe that this constitutional right, as with most others,3 6 is subject to waiver by the accused, as Simeone claimed. Accepting this premise, it is manifest that it is not the constitution,
but rather the ancient common law, that requires that an accused
be tried in the county in which he allegedly committed the criminal act.
In conclusion, it is submitted that we have long outgrown the
need to confine the jurisdiction of our trial courts to the boundaries
of the county in which they are situated. The identical laws prevail among the counties of a state and the assumption upon which
county-wide jurisdiction was based has become invalid. Moreover,
adherence to the rule expressed in Simeone results in the added
expense and inconvenience of additional prosecutions to the Commonwealth. Furthermore, unless the special verdict (or general
verdict with special findings) 3 7 is employed, the common law rule
may result in an unwarranted acquittal of a guilty man because of
the jury's failure to distinguish lack of jurisdiction from guilt. The
foregoing, however, is not meant to imply in any way that the accused be stripped of his right to a trial by a jury of the vicinage.
The defendant should simply be allowed to submit himself to the
jurisdiction of a court in another county by waiving his right to
trial in the county where the offense is found to have occurred.38
Thus, it is suggested that the courts depart from their common
law precedents, or even more desirable, that the General Assembly
promulgate legislation making criminal territorial jurisdiction
state-wide.
MARK SorR

34. E.g., Commonwealth v. Swanheart, 3 Pa. D. & C. 81 (Clear. 1922).
Thus, the Legislature may pass statutes enabling a court outside the
county in which the criminal act took place to hear the case.
35. See State v. Brown, 103 Vt. 312, 154 A. 579, 581 (1931) quoting
the Council of Censors in 1784:
[T]he verification of the facts in the vicinity where they happened is one of the greatest securities to life, liberty, and happiness.
36. See, e.g., Overmyer v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
37. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
38. This is not conferring jurisdiction on a court by consent of the
parties, but rather submission to a court which arguendo already possesses jurisdiction.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE-MIRANDA WARNINGS
NECESSARY TO VALID CONSENT

United States v. Menke, 339 F. Supp. 1023 (W.D. Pa. 1972)
In United States v. Menke,' the Federal District Court ruled
that an accused's consent to the warrantless search of his automobile did not constitute an effective waiver of his fourth amendment
rights when that consent was given after arrest and while confronted by a number of law enforcement officials with apparent
authority to search the automobile. Furthermore, the court held
that a warrantless consensual search is valid only if the subject of
the search has been specifically advised of his right to withhold
consent to the search. By this decision, Judge Teitlebaum rejected
the overwhelming weight of authority which has consistently held
that one need not be specifically advised2 of his fourth amendment
rights before giving an effective consent.
On February 12, 1970, Government agents, acting upon information received from postal authorities, inspected a parcel addressed to the defendant, Timothy Menke, and found it to contain
marihuana. The parcel was rewrapped and placed in the defendant's mailbox. Approximately one hour after Menke removed the
package, federal agents entered and searched the defendant's premises pursuant to a valid warrant. The agents were unable to find
the package containing the marihuana on the premises. The defendant testified that he was then taken outside and ordered to
open the trunk of his automobile, whereupon the package was
found. The agents, however, testified that the defendant, upon
questioning, volunteered the information that the package was in
the trunk of his automobile and that the defendant himself unlocked the trunk. In either event it was not disputed that Menke
was never advised of his right to refuse the warrantless search of
his automobile. The parcel containing the marihuana was seized
by the officers and the defendant indicted for violation of the narcotics laws.3 Motions to dismiss the indictment and to suppress
the evidence were subsequently heard by the district court with
1. 339 F. Supp. 1023 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
2. E.g., Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967); Robbins v. Mackenzie, 364 F.2d 45 (1st Cir. 1966); United States v. Rembert,
284 F. 996 (D.C. Tex. 1922), See generally Comment, Consent Search:
Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 12 ST. Louis L. REV. 297 (1968).

3. 26 U.S.C. § 4741(a) (1954); 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a) (1954).

Judge Teitlebaum presiding. The court rejected the Government's
contention that Menke effectively consented to the search and
granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence on the
basis that the defendant had not validly waived his fourth amendment rights as he was not advised of these rights before he alleg4
edly consented.
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution protects the people from unreasonable search and seizure.- Searches
and seizures made without probable cause and a proper warrant
are regarded as unreasonable and in violation of the fourth amendment6 subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.7 An effective consent constitutes one of the
recognized exceptions." The rationale for warrantless but consensual searches is twofold. First, because the fourth amendment
is for the individual's own protection, his consent or waiver of that
protection makes the resulting invasion of his privacy no longer
unconstitutional.9 Alternatively it is argued that the consent is
not a waiver at all, but simply makes the resulting search reasonable and therefore constitutional.'"
4. The Government also contended that the search was valid under
the warrantless search exception outlined in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925), which sanctions the warrantless search of an automobile when the exigent circumstances surrounding the search make it impracticable to secure a warrant. The court denied this contention based
on the reasoning in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971),
which precludes application of the Carroll principle to searches of parked
and unoccupied automobiles.
The defendant also averred that his right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed by the sixth amendment, was abridged by the inordinate length of
time between his arrest and hearing. The court denied the motion.
5.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV, states that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
Because the term "unreasonable" is a correlative term the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that "each case must be judged on its own
particular facts." Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
6. "Searches conducted outside the judicial process without prior
approval by judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable under the fourth
amendment." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
7. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (exigent circumstances); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (incident to
arrest); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (plain view); Warden
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Carrol
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobiles),
8. See Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Zeimer, 291 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1961); Judd v. United States,
190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See generally White, Effective Consent to
Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1965).
9. See Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946). See generally,
Comment, Effective Consent to Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 260
(1964).
10. See Comment, Consent Search: Waiver of Fourth Amendment
Rights, 12 ST. Louis L.J. 297 (1967).
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In Johnson v. Zerbst," the Supreme Court of the United States
defined a constitutionally valid consent as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' 12 More
specifically and with respect to the fourth amendment the Court in
Rosenthall v. Henderson13 ruled that "consent to search in order to
be voluntary, must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion, and is not lightly to be
inferred." 14 The ever present possibility of duress or coercion in
consent cases has prompted the courts to view purported waivers
of constitutional rights with suspicion, 15 often resulting in a presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.16
In making a determination as to the validity of an alleged consent to search, courts have invariably used either of two established tests. The first is characterized as the "subjective test" in
which the courts attempt a post hoc determination of the consenter's state of mind when the consent was given. 17 Under this
format the consent is only effective when, in fact, it is unequivocally and intelligently given.' 8 The alternative approach, the "objective test," requires that the courts consider the police conduct
prior to and concurrent with the alleged consent.' 9 Implicit in this
approach is the necessity of a determination as to whether that
conduct would coerce an individual in the defendant's position into
giving his consent.
Under the subjective approach the consenter's state of mind
can only be determined on a case by case basis requiring extensive
litigation of the issue. 20 The flexibility inherent in this approach
11. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
12. Id. at 464.
13. 389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968).
14. Id. at 516.
15. "True consent, free of fear or pressure, is not so readily to be
found." Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Accord,
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
16. See United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962), wherein the
court noted that "[c]onsent obtained under color of badge is presumptively coerced." Id. at 84; accord, Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819
(D.C. Cir. 1954).
17. See Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1965); Application of Tomich, 221 F. Supp. 500 (D. Mont. 1963); United States v. Gregory,
204 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp.
171 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See generally D. Wallenstein, Consent Searches, 4
Ca-M. L. BULL. 509 (1968).
18. See note 17 supra.
19. See United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Zeimer, 291 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1961). See generally Comment,
Effective Consent to Search and Seizures, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1964).
20. See note 19 supra. See also Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649

is often thought to commend its use; however, advocates of the
objective test note that impossibility of truly determining one's
motives or reasons for giving the consent. Alternatively, the objective formula eliminates the necessity of an involved case by
case analysis by measuring police conduct against a predetermined
standard of conduct. 2 1 This approach offers the advantages of
more efficient judicial administration, expanded appellate review,
by which the police themselves may
and ascertainable standards
22
gauge their conduct.

The use of objective criteria in the determination of consent
or constitutional waiver issues is not a recent innovation. Their
use has already been established with respect to fifth amendment
rights by the United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona.23 The Miranda warnings were a judicial response to the
overwhelming physical and psychological advantage held by the
police during custodial interrogation. 24 The procedural safeguards
contained in the warnings, considered in conjunction with other
objective factors, including possible duress and coercion, provide
a more concrete standard for determining the voluntariness of an
accused's incriminating statements. Furthermore, the warnings insure a more intelligent and knowing waiver. In Miranda, it was
noted that a specific warning of one's right to remain silent was
"the threshold requirement" for an intelligent decision as to the
25

exercise of that right.

Although the fourth and fifth amendments have often been
recognized as overlapping and protecting similar areas of personal
privacy,2 6 the courts have generally been unwilling to extend the
Miranda principle, by analogy, to fourth amendment rights. 27

In

Gorman v. United States2 the First Circuit Court held that a warning with respect to a warrantless search was implicit in the Miranda warnings and therefore unnecessary.
(D.C. Cir. 1951); "Each consent search must be decided upon its own facts."
Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 306 (9th Cir. 1964); accord United
States v. Zeimer, 291 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1961). See generally Comment,
Effective Consent to Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260 (1964).
21. See D. Wallenstein, Consent Searches, 4 Calm. L. BULL. 509
(1968).
22. See United States v. Zeimer, 291 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1961). See
also Comment, Consent Searches, 5 GONZAGA L. REv. 315 (1970).
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

24. See generally Comment, Consent Searches: A Reappraisal after

Mirandav. Arizona, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 130 (1967).

25.

384 U.S. at 468.

26. "The Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into each
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). See Davis v.
States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946); Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487
But cf. Schmnerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
27. E.g., Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1967);
States v. Dupont, 169 F. Supp. 572 (1959).
28. 380 F.2d 158 (lst Cir. 1967).

other."
United
(1944).
United
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To single out for further warning a request to search the
premises of an accused is to assume that a different order
of risks has not been covered at the threshold. But that
things which might be found in a search could be used
against an accused seems implicit in the warning of the
right to remain silent. 29
It has also been suggested that because the validity of the search
is founded upon the "communicative assent" of the subject, "the
vitality of fourth amendment rights are critically dependent on the
protective armor of the privilege against self-incrimination," and
therefore adequately protected by the present Miranda warnings.30
In addition, factors which were considered compelling by the Court
in Miranda-custodial interrogation in an unfamiliar and hostile
environment with no communication outside of the police station
-are not characteristic of the usual warrantless search situation
where the subject is at home or with friends and not in police custody.31 Another consideration of the courts is the possible repercussion that a warning requirement may have on police efficiency.
The most persistent criticism of the Miranda warnings has been
its alleged impairment of the police function, and accordingly, the
8 2
courts are hesitant to further impair these efforts.
The court in Menke, without making direct reference to the
aforementioned subjective and objective tests, nevertheless applied
them in making its determination as to the validity of the consent
in question. With respect to the subjective format, the court observed that Menke was uneducated and unsophisticated in matters
of searches and seizures. 33 The consenter's character, training,
knowledge and experience are, of necessity, under the subjective
test. 4 As Menke appeared to be lacking in many of these respects,
the court concluded that his state of mind was not properly that
of one who knowingly and intentionally waived his constitutional
rights. Menke's consent was also held to be invalid under the objective test. The Menke court noted that "there were seven law
enforcement officers in the defendant's home, he was arrested,
and a search warrant was produced authorizing a search of the
29.

30.

Id. at 164.

See Government of Virgin Islands v. Berne, 412 F.2d 1055, 1059

(3d Cir. 1969).
31. See Wallenstein, Consent Searches, 4 CRm. L. BULL. 509 (1968).
32. Comment, Consent Search: Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights,
12 ST. Louis L. REv. 297 (1968).
33. 339 F. Supp. at 1029.
34. E.g., United States v. Wai Law, 215 F. Supp. 684 (D.C.N.Y. 1963)
(poor understanding of English); United States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp. 859
(D.C.D. 1958) (inarticulate); United States v. Alberti, 120 F. Supp. 171
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (demeanor).

premises."3 5 Factors such as the manner of arrest, 6 the presence
of interrogation,3 7 and the consenter's cooperation with the police 8
are often decisive considerations under the objective approach. In
light of these criteria, the court in Menke found an excessive display of authority on the part of the police, which when coupled
with an apparent authority to search the car, gave the agent's in'39
quiries "the same effect as a demand or order.
Although the foregoing analysis in itself was sufficient to determine that Menke's consent was ineffective as a constitutional
waiver, the court additionally held that "the failure of the agents
to specifically advise [the defendant] of his right to refuse to allow
the search makes the search and seizure unreasonable. ' 40 In so
doing, Judge Teitlebaum rejected the overwhelming weight of authority 4' by drawing an analogy between the Miranda ruling and
fourth amendment rights. In Miranda, the Court noted that a specific warning of one's right to remain silent was "the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its exercise." 42 The district court reasoned that this threshold requirement is no less important for the proper exercise of one's fourth amendment rights 43

because the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures "is certainly as sacred as the right to be free from compelled
self incrimination, and accordingly its protection should be equally
solicitous."

44

The Menke court was not the first to extend the Miranda ruling, by analogy, to fourth amendment rights. In United States v.
Blalock45 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pointed out that:
[O]ne cannot intelligently surrender that which he
does not know he has. . . . The fourth amendment requires no less knowing a waiver than do the fifth and
sixth. The requirement of knowledge in each serves the
same purpose, i.e., to prevent the possibility that the ig35.

339 F. Supp. at 1030.

36. See United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687 (D.C. Mass. 1954).
37. See Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
United States v. Wallace, 160 F. Supp. 859 (D.C.D. 1958).
38. The courts have often held that when the accused actively assists
the officers in their search, his consent is deemed voluntary. Raimondi
v. United States, 207 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1953); Windsor v. United States,
286 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1923).
39. 339 F. Supp. at 1029. Accord, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968), wherein the court ruled that "[mI]ere acquiesence to a
claim of lawful authority will not constitute an effective consent." Id.
at 550.
40. 339 F. Supp. at 1029.
41. See note 2 supra.
42. 384 U.S. 468.
43. 399 F. Supp. at 1028. Accord, Bustamonte v. Schnecklorh, 448
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1971).
44. 399 F. Supp. at 1028.
45. 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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norant may surrender their rights more readily than the
shrewd ....

To require law enforcement agents to ad-

vise the subjects of investigation of their rights to insist
on a search warrant, would impose no great burden, nor
would 4it unduly or unnecessarily impede criminal investigation. 0
This language clearly reflects the rationale of the few courts, including the Menke court, which have adopted the specific warning
47
requirement for waiver of fourth amendment rights.
Although courts generally do not require the Miranda warnings in search and seizure cases, they have in some instances held
that the failure to advise the subject of these rights is a factor to
be considered in the determination of the validity of an alleged
consent. 48 Under such a rule the significance of an officer's failure
to advise a subject of his fourth amendment rights would vary
inversely with such factors as the mentality and experience of the
consenter. For example, a person very knowledgeable with respect to warrant requirements would not require the warning
while one lacking such knowledge would require the warning. As
a result, there appears to be a growing tendency on the part of the
police to offer specific warnings prior to accepting a subject's consent, even though not constitutionally required to do so.49
In Pennsylvania, the question of whether, in the absence of
a specific warning of one's fourth amendment rights, an effective
consent can be given to a warrantless search, remains unanswered. 0 The United States District Courts of Pennsylvania, by
their holdings in Menke and Blalock, do require a specific warning
of fourth amendment rights. However, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to adopt such a warning requirement in Government of Virgin Islands v. Berne,51 leaving the question of a
fourth amendment warning requirement unsettled in Pennsylvania.
46. Id. at 269.
47. United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
48. See Rosenthall v. Henderson, 389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968).
49. See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 369 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1967).
50. In Commonwealth v. Harris, 429 Pa. 215, 239 A.2d 290 (1968), the
court after determining an alleged consent to be the product of police
coercion and therefore ineffectual, stated that "we need not reach the
question of whether or not there can be an effective consent to a search in
the absence of a warning of constitutional rights." Id. at 221, 239 A.2d at
29M
51. 412 F.2d 1055 (1969). "The production of a knife by the defendant, when fully cognizant of his right to remain silent and fully aware
that the information he provides may be used against him, does not violate
the fourth amendment." Id. at 1062.

A specific warning of one's fourth amendment rights, when
considered in conjunction with the subjective and objective tests
presently employed by the courts, would greatly simplify the determination of consent issues and at the same time provide adequate safeguards for the individual. With respect to the subjective
criteria, the warning would serve to "inform" the consenter of
his rights thereby assuring a more "intelligent" and "knowing"
waiver, exercised freely and without fear of police retaliation. Alternatively, and with respect to objective considerations, a warning would establish a standard of police conduct which would diminish the number of consents given under duress. One would be
less likely to succumb to duress when advised of his right to refuse
the search. However, the courts must also consider the reports
of impaired police efficiency resulting from the present Miranda
warnings. 52 These factors must be weighed before the issue of
fourth amendment warnings may be settled, and until the United
States Supreme Court considers the question, the lower courts can
justifiably rule either way.
ROBERT 0. VAN HORN

52. See State v. Forney, 150 N.W.2d 915 (Neb. 1967), wherein the
court noted that "the United States Supreme Court has not applied the
Miranda test to search and seizures. Until it does so, if it ever does, we
should not further shackle law enforcement." Id. at 917-18. With regard to the fourth amendment the United States Supreme Court itself
has stated that "the requirements of the Fourth Amendment are not inflexible, or obtusely unyielding to the legitimate needs of law enforcement." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967). See generally L.
Singer, The Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment, 60 CnmW. L.J.
493 (1968); Comment, Miranda v. Arizona and the Fourth Amendment,
46 N.C. L. REv. 142 (1967).

EDUCATION:

THE RIGHT OF RETARDED

CHILDREN TO RECEIVE AN EDUCATION
SUITED TO THEIR NEEDS

Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth,
343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D.Pa. 1972).
Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
The rights of retarded children of school age to receive a free
publicly-supported education have largely gone unrecognized and
unenforced throughout the history of public education. Recently,
however, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania has ruled that Pennsylvania has a constitutional duty
to provide all retarded children in the Commonwealth with a free
public education suited to their needs.' Drawing upon the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment the court man-

dated that retarded children be given the right to an equal educational opportunity. To insure that opportunity the court required
that each school grant a hearing before any child is classified as
retarded or transferred to any class outside of the normal educational program. The Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia extended the principle of PARC, ruling that the Board
of Education of the District of Columbia has a duty to provide a
free public education to all children labeled as mentally retarded,
emotionally disturbed, behavioral problems or hyperactive. 2 The
court held that due process requires an adequate hearing prior to
any child's being suspended or expelled from regular schooling or
being reassigned for special instruction.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that
"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments . .. and [i] t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportu-

nity of an education." However since the right to a public education is not secured by the Constitution 4 and remains unrecognized
1. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 343
F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) [hereinafter cited as PARC].
2. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
3. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
4. Flemming v. Adams, 377 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,

as a fundamental interest, 5 it only exists insofar as it is granted
by state legislatures. Yet once a state undertakes to provide public
education, it must be equally available to all citizens since the
right becomes subject to both the equal protection and due process guarantees of the fourteenth amendment.6
Unfortunately for countless numbers of children, the existence
of a right and its enforcement are not one and the same. The
President's Commission on Mental Retardation estimates that fully
sixty per cent of the children of school age who are retarded are
not receiving an education.7 The court in PARC found that there
may be as many as fifty thousand retarded children of school age
who are excluded from any education in the Commonweath. s The
Mills court placed the estimate for the District of Columbia at
eighteen thousand. 9 The problem is clearly one of grave national
dimensions.' 0
The compulsory school attendance laws of Pennsylvania and
the District of Columbia provide that the required attendance provisions shall not apply to any child who is found to be unable to
"profit" from attendance at school." The plaintiffs in both PARC
and Mills charged that these provisions were used by school districts to exclude retarded students from the educational system.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' use of these statutory provisions 12 violated the constitutional rights of retarded children under the fourteenth amendment.
The challenge to the application of these statutes to exclude
mentally retarded children from the schools was brought in the
form of a class action. 3 The class in PARA consisted of all mentally retarded children in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania be389 U.S. 898 (1967).
Conn. 1970).

See also McClellan v. Shapiro, 315 F. Supp. 484 (D.

5. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S. Ct. 1278,

1297 (1973).
6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
See also
Griffin v. City School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958); Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.2d 418 (8th Cir. 1960).
7. PRESIDENT'S COM'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, ANNUAL REPORT

(1969) at 18.
8. 343 F.

Supp. 279, 296. See, e.g., D. STEDMAN AND D. SHERWOOD,
COMMUNITY, AVERAGE INCIDENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION
BASED ON 1965 CENSUS FIGURES IN FOUR POPULATIONS, 100,000 PEOPLE (1967).
9. 348 F. Supp. 866, 868. See DISTRICT OF COLumBIA BD. OF EDuc.,
HYPOTHETICAL

RATIONALE FOR TASK FORCE ON SPECIAL EDuc. (1971) at 1.
10. See, e.g., REGAL, ELLIOT, GROSSiAN AND MORSE, THE SYSTEMATIC
EXCLUSION OF CHILDREN FROM SCHOOL (1971).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1330(2) (Supp. 1972-73); D.C. CODE

ANN.§ 31-203 (Supp. v. 1972).
12. The courts were also asked to consider other statutes.

ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1304, 1326, 1330, and 1375 (Supp. 1972-73).
ANN. §§ 31-101, 103, 201, 203, 207 and 208 (Supp. V, 1972).
13. FED. R. CIv. P. 23 (b) (1) (B).

PA. STAT.

D.C. CODE
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tween the ages of six and twenty-one who had been denied access
to a free public program of education and training.1 4 The plaintiffs in Mills sued on behalf of all residents of the District of Columbia of school age who had been excluded from a free public
education or otherwise deprived of access to publicly-supported
education.1" In PARC the plaintiffs invoked the jurisdiction of a
three-judge court to challenge the exclusionary statute under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 228418 alleging that the constitutional issue presented by the Pennsylvania statute's violation of equal protection
and due process was not "plainly insubstantial." 17 The plaintiffs
stated their cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.18
The plaintiffs in Mills chose to use the jurisdictional conduit of 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201; 19 they also stated their cause of action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.20
The courts in each case were confronted with two issues:
whether the defendants' actions in classifying the plaintiffs as retarded, causing their exclusion from the normal educational system, had denied them equal protection under the law in violation
of the Constitution; and whether the classification processes were
violative of plaintiffs' rights to due process.
The equal protection dispute in PARC was settled by agreement between the parties rather than by judicial determination.
A consent agreement was submitted to the court, which in accepting the agreement entered an interim order temporarily enjoining
the defendants from applying the challenged statutes so as to deny
retarded children access to a public education. 21 At a hearing held
to examine objections to the proposed settlement, objections were
22
raised to the court's jurisdiction over the equal protection claims.
Evaluating this objection the court employed a rather simple syllogism. Reasoning that since "[a] ll mentally retarded children are
14.
15.
16.
Statute

343 F. Supp. 279, 282.
348 F. Supp. 866, 870.
28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1968), Injunction Against Enforcement of State
Three-judge Court Required.

17. See Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713,
715 (1962); Ex parte Porsky, 290 U.S. 30, 32 (1933). For cases of the same
circuit where a three judge court was convened, see McElroy v. Santiago,
319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Cooper v. Laupheimer, 316 F. Supp. 264
(E.D. Pa. 1970); Woods v. Miller, 312 F. Supp. 315 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1968), Equal Rights Under the Law; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1968), Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1968), Civil Rights and Elective Franchise.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1968), Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights.
21. 343 F. Supp. 279, 288.
22. Id. at 296.

are capable of benefiting from a program of education and training,"2 3 and since there is no "rational basis" ' 24 for excluding from
the educational process one capable of learning, therefore, there
can be no basis for excluding retarded children from the educational system.25 The court thus adopted the traditional equal protection test of "whether the challenged state action rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose or interest,"26 and held that there
27
was no rational basis for the exclusions.
The Mills court, evaluating actions of the Board of Education
of the District of Columbia, could not rely upon the fourteenth
amendment since it requires that "[n]o state ' 28 may deprive any
person of the equal protection of the laws. The court relied upon
Bolling v. Sharpe,29 which was decided the same day as Brown,80
which applied the Brown rationale that education must be made
available on equal terms2 ' to the District of Columbia. The court
in Mills also placed considerable emphasis on Hobson v. Hansen.2
The Hobson decision is interesting for the manner in which it
found equal protection applicable to the District of Columbia. The
Hobson court recognized that Bolling3s had found that the equal
protection clause's proscription against de jure school segregation
was an element of due process under the fifth amendment, thereby
applicable to the District of Columbia.3 4 Other doctrines of equal
protection, the Hobson court reasoned, were also included within
the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Looking to the Supreme Court's findings that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was elastic enough to embrace not only the
first35 and fourth36 amendments but also the self-incrimination
clause of the fifth, 37 the speedy trial, confrontation and assistance
of counsel clauses of the sixth38 and the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth;' the Hobson court held that the doctrine of equal educational opportunity espoused in Brown40 "is in
*

23. Id.
24. Id. at 297.
25. Id. citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 483 (1954).
26. McGinnis v. Royster, 93 S. Ct. 1055, 1059 (1973); San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1308 (1973).
27. 343 F. Supp. 279, 297.
28. U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
29. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
30. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Id. at 493.
32. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.C.D.C. 1967).
33. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
34. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 492 (D.C.D.C. 1987).
35. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
36. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
37. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
38. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
39. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
40. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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its full sweep a component of due process binding on the District
[of Columbia] under the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 4' The Mills court concluded that since the denial of an
42
equal education to poor people violated the due process clause,
then "[a] fortiori ...

denying ... [retarded children] not just an

equal publicly-supported education but all publicly-supported education while providing such education to other children, is viola43
tive of the Due Process Clause.1
Each court also considered whether the plaintiffs had been
unconstitutionally denied rights of procedural due process. The
courts took note in each case of the fact that the plaintiffs had
been denied an adequate hearing before classification and that
44
they had been completely denied review of their status.

In considering the due process issue, the PARC court held over
objections of administrative and financial burdens that "due process requires a hearing before retarded children may be denied
a public education" 45 and that the parents of retarded children had
not been afforded a hearing and, in many instances, even notice
of their child's exclusion from public school. The court found
that "such crass and summary treatment ...

becomes suspect...

because of the stigma which our society unfortunately attaches to
the label of mental retardation." The Mills court needed but a
single paragraph to conclude that "[d] ue process of law requires a
hearing prior to exclusion, termination of [sic] classification into a
special program," 46 holding that the failure to afford a hearing and
periodic review "cannot be excused by the claim that there are in47
sufficient funds."
Both the PARC and Mills courts sought to fashion a decree
41. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 493 (D.C.D.C. 1967).
42. Id.
43. 248 F. Supp. 866, 875.
44. Id. at 869-70.
45. 243 F. Supp. 279, 293.
46. 248 F. Supp. 866, 875. The Mills court cited the following cases
in support of this finding: Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Williams v. Dade County School Bd., 441 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1971); Dixon v.
Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 930 (1961); Vought v. Van Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388
(E.D. Mich. 1969); Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wisc. 1968).
In addition, see Snaidach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969)
(prejudgment garnishment); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)
(deprivation of parenthood); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S.
232 (1957) (right to take bar examination); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536
(1956) (dismissal from employment); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091
(E.D. Pa. 1970) (confession of judgment).
47. 348 F. Supp. 866, 876.

which would provide remedial relief from the exclusionary policies. The decrees which were entered establish the rights of each
class of plaintiff to equal educational opportunities, to due process
in classification, and to the immediate end of exclusion from the
educational system. 48 The PARC decision recognized the constitutional duty of the Commonwealth to educate each retarded child
in Pennsylvania, stating that "[i] t is the Commonwealth's obligation to place each mentally retarded child in a free, public program
of education and training appropriate to the child's capacity. .... -49
The defendants were ordered to cease from applying the compulsory attendance law in any manner which would postpone or
deny access to free public education;50 the court held that such
law meant that parents were excused from liability under the compulsory attendance provisions, and that students could not be excluded under the provision.5 1 It was also held that pre-school programs were to be included under the decree and that school districts providing pre-school classes were obligated to include instruction tailored to the needs of retarded pre-schoolers .5 The
order provided that no child may be excluded from regular classes,
suspended, reassigned or otherwise subjected to a change in educational status without due process. The due process as envisioned
by the court includes timely notice of any proposed action and a
full hearing. 5" presided over by an impartial officer.5 4 The school
district has the burden of proof5 5 and the parent has the right to
counsel, 56 access to records, 57 presentation of evidence and witnesses,58 and cross-examination.5 9 An immediate reevaluation of
all persons classified as retarded was ordered,60 and provisions
were to be made for the periodic review of classification.5 1
The order entered in Mills extended the protections established
in PARC. The Board of Education was enjoined from excluding
plaintiffs and their class from a regular school assignment without
providing for adequate and immediate alternative education and a
constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review.6 2 Or48. For cases considering the importance of timely review and im-

mediate action, see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971);
Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
49. 343 F. Supp. 279, 307, para. 7.
50. Id. at 308, para. 9.

51. Id. at 310, para. 20.
52. Id. para. 22.
53. Id. at 303-04, para. a-i.
54. Id. at 305, para. 1.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. para. o.
Id. para. q.
Id. para. r.
Id. para. t.
Id. para. s.
Id. at 314, para. 42.
Id. at 308, para. 12.
348 F. Supp. 866, 878, para. 2.
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dering the Board to evaluate the needs of all children classified
as "exceptional, '6 3 the court called for a comprehensive plan providing for the identification, notification, assessment and placement of all class members.6 4 Finally, hearing procedures were established substantially similar to thosee set out in PARC,65 but the
court extended this protection to any child suspended for a period
of longer than two days for disciplinary reasons. 66
PARC and Mills represent a milestone in civil rights litigation,
by their recognition of rights which have long been considered by
school officials to be nonexistent. There remain, however, unanswered questions. Still to be considered are other methods of discrimination and exclusion operating within the normal educational program. One such method is known as a track system.
Found in over ninety per cent of our publicly-supported high
schools. 67 a track system refers to differentiated courses of study
offered to the high school student. Tracks may be labeled as college preparatory, business vocational or general, all requiring or
forbidding certain courses to students in each track. The track
system has been described as:
(1) . . . [creating] a hierarchy of social and educational
standing not based on merit; (2) ... ratify [ing] social

caste standings and reinforc [ing] stereotypes; and (3) ...
reduc[ing] most students' educational opportunities, but
open[ing] virtually no new job possibilities.6"
The question of whether the classification procedures by which a
student is relagated to a particular tract deny equal educational
opportunities or violate due process remains largely unanswered.
A further question is whether a student who feels that he may
better benefit from classes in special education may invoke the
hearing procedure to require a school to transfer him to a program
more suited to his needs.
PARC and Mills have sought to solve one long-standing educational problem, granting to retarded children "new hope in their
quest for a life of dignity and self-sufficiency."6 9 Foreshadowing
other attacks upon educational classifications, PARC and Mills
63.
64.
65.
66.

67.

Id. at 879, para. 9.
Id. para. 10.
Id. at 880-81, para. 13.
Id. at 878, para. 4.
See HAvAR UmNvERsrry CENTm roR LAw AND EDUCATION, CLASS-

IFIcATrON MATEaALS (1972) at 1.

68.
69.

Id.
343 F. Supp. 279, 302.

serve as a springboard for greater equality of educational oppor70
tunity.
R. STEPHEm SHBLA

70. See, e.g., Chapman v. Gerard, 456 F.2d 577 (3d Cir. 1972) (Statute
barring residents of the Virgin Islands from participating in territorial
scholarship fund solely by reason of alienage held unconstitutional);
Kline v. Vlandis, 346 F. Supp. 526 (D. Conn. 1972) (Statute imposing
higher fees at state university for non-residents held invalid where it did
not permit a charge in residency status for purposes of seeking an education); Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (use of I.Q.
test for purposes of determining whether to place black students in classes
for mentally retarded held invalid).
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George F. Taylor
_____1802 Law & Finance Bldg.,
Hirsch, Weise & Tillman .
.
.2
Frick Bldg.,
C. John Tillman
George H. Thompson
Nicholas Unkovic ----747 Union Trust Bldg.,

Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh

ARmsTRONG CoUNTY

Harvey H. Heilman, Jr., Esq......... 200 No. Water St., Kittanning
BEDFORD COUNTY

Koontz & Koontz -------Bedford Professional Bldg., Bedford
Ray G. Replogle
....------------.....--------....
12 Public Square, Bedford
Stanley G. Stroup ..................- No. 8 Public Square, Bedford
BEms CouNTY
Adam B. Krafczek ----.........
44 N. 6th St., Reading
Calvin Lieberman ................................_635 W alnut St., Reading
John E. Marx
.------------------P.O. Box 92, Reading
Clarence C. Mendelsohn -------119 North Sixth St., Reading 19601
Robert F. Shapiro -------------532 Washington St., Reading
Stevens & Lee ----.-----------..---------P. 0. Box 679, Reading 19603
John B. Stevens, Jr..529
Court St., Reading
BLAIR COUNTY

Abraham Colbus -..----...........-------- Central Trust Bldg., Altoona
Martin Goodman
----------- 203 Central Trust Bldg., Altoona
Schaeline and Leopold _318 Pleasant Valley Boulevard, Altoona
BlADFODr

COUNTY

Robert J. Landy

Desmond St., Sayre

PATRONS OF DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
BucKs Coui'r
_

Liederbach & Eimer
Stanley W. Rutkowski

539 Street Rd., Southhampton
3 Five Points Professional Bldg.,
Levittown

BUTLE COUNTY
Richard L. McCandless _.__128 West Diamond St., Butler 16001
CAMBRIA CoUrY

William F. Patterson ---....----- 809 Johnstown Bank & Trust Bldg.,
Johnstown
CAM RON COUNTY
John E. Rydesky -- -................... National Bank Bldg., Emporium
Tompkins & Tompkins ......................- So. Cherry St., Emporium
CARBON COUNTY
Raymond F. Smith --- ..-------

-

P. 0. Box 155, Palmertown

CENTRE COUNTY

107 E. High St., Bellefonte
MaQuaide, Blasko, Brown, & Geiser ---421 E. Beaver St., State College
Charles C. Brown, Jr.
John W. Blasko
Delbert J. McQuaide
John L. Geiser
CHSTER COUNTY
24 West Market St., West Chester
Fred T. Cadmus ----- ...-----------Kennett Square
Alfred Delduco ----------....-............-------............---W illiam L. McLaughlin ..................--.... 23 So. Valley Rd., Paoli
CLARION COUNTY

Chester H. Byerly

352A Broad Street, New Bethlehem
-..........

CLEARFIELD COUNTY

Carl A . Belin

.... -..
.....

....

.

....

. ........

Clearfield

COLUMBIA COUNTY

Robert E. Bull
John Arnold Crisman .......
Thomas J. Evans
--John M. Kuchka ----

106-A Market St., Berwick
116 W. 2nd St., Berwick
6 W. Main St., Bloomsburg
132 East Front St., Berwick

CRAWFORD COUNTY

Culbertson, Weiss & Schetroma

349 Center St., Meadville

PATRONS OF DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
CUMBERLAND COUN

Hyman Goldstein - --.
O.O.F. Bldg., Carlisle
James R. Humer
Farmer's Tr. Co. Bldg., Carlisle
Irwin, Irwin & Irwin .4
S. Hanover St., Carlisle
Kramer & Kramer -...- ----.........
7 Irvine Row, Carlisle
Landis, McIntosh & Black
-36 South Hanover St., Carlisle
Marion R. Lower -------------- - ------------.
. 29 W. Pomfret St., Carlisle
William R. Mark ----------113 East King St., Shippensburg
John E. Myers
-------------- 301 Market St., Lemoyne
Robert L. Myers ----------......----.-------8 W. High St., Carlisle
F. Charles Petrillo
---Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle
Sylvia H. Rambo --------....---..........----1 West High St., Carlisle 17013
Hilton A. Russel
24 E. King St., Shippensburg
Hon. Clinton R. Weidner----9th Judicial Dist., Carlisle
DAuPHin CoUmN

Lewis F. Adler

_

_

_125 Locust St., Harrisburg

William S. Bailey ............................-216 Locust St., Harrisburg
Jay R. Braderman ______1005 Payne, Shoemaker Bldg., Harrisburg
Caldwell, Clouser & Kearns

123 Walnut St., Harrisburg

Walter H. Compton

22 S. 3rd St., Harrisburg

Daniels and Swope

First Federal Savings & Loan Bldg.,
232 N. Second St., Harrisburg 17108

Hurwitz, Klein, Benjamin & Angino -22 S. Third St., Harrisburg
Knupp and Knupp .
Robert Ewing Knupp
Robert Louis Knupp

..

.07

Metzger, Wickersham, Knauss &
Gerald K. Morrison
Edward Munce -------

-- --

-

N. Front St., Harrisburg

Keystone Bldg.,
22 South Third St., Harrisburg
ERB -----------

-400 N. 3rd St., Harrisburg

P.U.C. Law Bureau, North Office Bldg.,
Harrisburg

Rhoads, Sinon & Reader .400

N. 3rd St., Harrisburg

Smith, Fox, Foerster & Finkelstein ............- 2917 North Front St.,
Harrisburg
William H. Wood --------.........----------

210 Walnut St., Harrisburg

Woodside, Woodside & Zwally ------------ William M. Young

__

N. Market St.,
3rd Floor, Harrisburg

308 N. 2nd St., Harrisburg

PATRONS OF DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
DELAWARE COUNTY
Thomas J. Beagan, Jr.
22 West Second St., Media 19063
Reese A. Davis ------.------- First Pennsylvania Co. Bldg., Wayne
ERIE COUNTY

Eugene J. Brew, Jr.
-----....................
702 Sassafras St.,
Walter A. Dart, Jr -.--- ...................---------el Bldg.,
John R. Falcone
..
ite
713 French St.,
M. Fletcher Gornall ............................-1304-08 Baldwin Bldg.,
James G. Hanes -......-----------824 G. Daniel Baldwin Bldg.,
Paul B. Joslin .......................
- _
_l206 Baldwin Bldg.,
Michael M. Palmisano ------------------ Masonic Temple Bldg.,

Erie
Erie
Erie
Erie
Erie
Erie
Erie

FRANKLIN COUNTY
Roy S. F. Angle------------

.80 W. Main St., Waynesboro

JEFFERSON COUNT'Y

Mark Katzen

1R.D.
, Reynoldsville

LACKAWANNA COUNTY

Eugene J. Anastasio --------715 Main St.,
Ralph P. Carey
------------ Suite 500, Miller Bldg.,
Richard G. Fine ------------ Suite 300, Miller Bldg.,
M. J. Kushmerick ----600 Scranton Life Bldg.,
Jack Rubenfeld -----------------....... 800 Scranton Life Bldg.,

Peckville
Scranton
Scranton
Scranton
Scranton

LANCASTER COUNTY

Charles A. Achey, Jr
---------- 45 N. Duke St.,
James P. Coho
---53 N. Duke St.,
Carl G. Herr
--------------------7 N. Duke St.,
Louise G. Herr .................................... _7 N. Duke St.,
Paul F. McKinsey --------..........-------------- 232 E. Orange St.,
Shirk, Reist, Buckwalter -----------132 E. Chestnut St.,

Lancaster
Lancaster
Lancaster
Lancaster
Lancaster
Lancaster

LEBANON COUNrY

Davis, Katz, Buzgon & Davis
525 S. Eighth St., Lebanon
Philip S. Davis
Bernerd A. Buzgon
Thomas E. Ehrgood --......------------- Farmers Trust Bldg., Lebanon
Edward H. Miller
-847 Cumberland St., Lebanon
Egli, Wallen & Reilley
_
44 N. 8th St., Lebanon, Pa. 17042
Robert Sullivan .......815 Cumberland St., Lebanon
-

PATRONS OF DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
LEHIGH COUNTY

Jerome B. Frank
3
832 Hamilton St., Allentown
John J. DeMarines ------.-446 Linden Street, Allentown 18102
Joseph F. Fruhwirth, Jr .__---...
43 N. 5th St., Allentown
Gearhart & Gearhart --------........
42 Walnut St., Allentown
James C. Lanshe, Esq.-----.--. 469 Linden Street, Allentown
Hyman Rockmaker --............------B. & B. Bldg., Allentown
Thomas E. Weaver ...............-Lehigh Nat'l Bank bldg., Catasauqua
LUZERNE COUNTY

Albert H. Aston ....- 118 Orchard East, Newberry Estate, Dallas
Richard L. Bigelow
D #R4
4, Mountaintop
E. Charles Coslett ---760 Miners Nat'l Bank Bldg., Wilkes-Barre
John E. Costack ------.......... 211 Hazleton Nat'l Bank Bldg., Hazleton
Falvello, Ustynoski, Guillani & Bernstein
............ _305-7 Hazleton Nat'l Bank Bldg., Hazleton
Arthur H. James -- ---------- 112 Church St., Plymouth, Pa.
Laputka, Bayless, Ecker & Cohen ______605 Trader's Bank Bldg.,
Hazleton
Anthony P. Moses -----............ 960 Miners Nat'l Bank Building,
Wilkes-Barre
Sandor Yelen ----...------ 550 Miners Nat'l Bank Bldg., Wilkes-Barre
LyCOMING COUNTY

Greevy, Knittle & Mitchell --------29 W. 4th St.,
Hon. Charles F. Greevy -Court of Common Pleas,
George Hess -..-------...-.......---------.
329 Market St.,
William S. Kieser .
.31
Diamond St.,
Daniel F. Knittle ..
.708 Highland Terrace,
Walter R. Rice, Esq.
4 West Fourth St.,
0. W. Vanderlin
433 Market St.,

Williamsport
Williamsport
Williamsport
Williamsport
Williamsport
Williamsport
Williamsport

McKEAN COUNTY
Mutzabaugh & Mutzabaugh .

.52

Boylston St., Bradford

MIFFLIN COUNTY

Brugler and Levin -------------------------------1 0 S. Wayne St., Lewistown
Norman L. Levin
Robert B. Brugler
Jeffrey L. Snook

PATRONS OF DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Houck, Barron & Zimmerman - -...........24 N. Main St., Lewistown
Harold W. Houck (1932-1973)
David McNitt Barron
Lester H. Zimmerman, Jr.
------- 12 S. Main St., Lewistown
-.
--------Siegel and Siegel
MONROE CouNTY
Lee B. Koehler -----.......----47 S. Courtland St., East
J. Joseph McCfuskey---------7th & Monroe Sts.,
Scanlon & Lewis -......------- 190 Washington St., East
James C. Scanlon, Partner
Kennard Lewis, Partner
Ropert G. Williamson, Associate
Williams & Williams --------...------ 28 N. Seventh St.,

Stroudsburg
Stroudsburg
Stroudsburg

Stroudsburg

MONTGOMERY COUNTY

Binder, Binder &Kalis ..........................-345 King St., Pottstown
William R. Cooper ................................. 329 W. Main St., Lansdale
Leon H. Fox ---------------------.----.-.-----.......
523 Swede St., Norristown
Gerber, Davenport & Wilenzik -------------....
18 West Airy Street,
Norristown, Pa. 19401
Alonzo R. Horsey ------530 Dekalb St., Norristown
James N. Peck ...............................- 505 Church St., Norristown
Prince & Prince .........................-North End Professional Bldg. &
933 N. Charlotte St., Pottstown 19464
J. Willard Schoelkopf ---------------- 402 Main St., Red Hill
NORTHAMPTON COUNTY

Jerome W. Burkepile, Jr
1------851 Main St., Northampton
Goodman & Goodman ----------------------92 E. Broad St., Bethlehem
Edward P. Turtzo
-.................-- ----109 Broadway, Bangor
NORTHUMBERLAND COUNTY

William W. Belford
Lark, Makowski & Marateck
Carl Rice .

..

-----.------------ 2 S. Front St., Milton
--Pa. National Bank Bldg.,
Shamokin
.
Market St., Sunbury

PERRY COUNTY

Allan W. Holman ----.------------..
Hon. Charles W. Kugler

16 E. Main St., New Bloomfield
---------New Bloomfield

PHILADELPHIA COUNTY

Robert D. Abrahams ..........--- 1730 Land Title Bldg., Philadelphia
Ballard, Spahr, Andrews &Ingersoll
1730 Land Title Bldg., Philadelphia

PATRONS OF DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
Robert C. Duffy

1938 Philadelphia Nat'l Bank Bldg.,
Philadelphia
David N. Feldman ----------.-................------316-317 Lafayette Building,
N.E. Cor. 5th &Chestnut Streets,
Philadelphia
Perrin C. Hamilton
1640 Philadelphia Nat'l Bank Bldg.,
Broad & Chestnut Sts., Philadelphia
Morgan R. Jones ----------------------1100 Philadelphia Nat'l Bank Bldg.,
Broad and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia
Harry A. Kalish --2635 Fidelity-Phila. Trust Bldg., Philadelphia
Barnet Lieberman _1730 Land Title Building, Philadelphia 19110
Milford J. Meyer -----Suite 1200, One E. Penn Sq., Philadelphia
Weston C. Overholt, Jr -.........------- 1018 Western Saving Fund Bldg.,
Philadelphia
John C. Schmidt
------------ 5th & Olney Aves., Philadelphia
H. Mark Salomon ----------------------2044 Chestnut St., Philadelphia
William P. Thorn ---------1901 Three Penn Center, Philadelphia
-----

PIKE COUNTY

William C. Gumble ---------................------------------Dorothy Stroh Tisdale
-

409 Broad St., Milford
Milford

POTTER COUNTY
James S. Berger -------------22 East Second St., Coudersport
Mahaley & Duvall ---------------Box 429, Coudersport
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY

Hon. Guy A. Bowe, Jr -................-------------------

21st Judicial District
Court House, Pottsville
H. Franklin Kehler ---------.....-------- 505 Centre St., Ashland
Miernicki and Miernicki -------------------100 N. Jardin St., Shenandoah
W. Alan Williams ------- 102 E. Main St., Schuylkill Haven 17972
SOMERSET COUNTY

Fike, Cascio & Boose -N.
A lexander Ogle ................................. .......

Center Ave., Somerset
........................ Som erset

TIOGA COUNTY

Farr &Van der Hiel ---------------------------------------------------------.....
..
M ansfield
Warren H. Spencer ---- 17 Central Ave., Wellsboro
UNION COUNTY

W. Roger Fetter --Wilson & Matson

-----

433 Market St., Lewisburg
222 Market St., Lewisberg

PATRONS OF DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
W AR

Cotrn

Mervine & Calderwood ___304 Warren Nat'l Bank Bldg., Warren
Joseph H. Goldstein -.....------- Warren Nat'l Bank Bldg., Warren
WASHINGTON COUNTY
Barna & Barna .-..-.--.............-------- 7th & McKean Ave., Donora
Thomas D. Gladden 00
Washington Trust Bldg.,
Washington 15301
Lawrence R. Zene ------------ 150 W. Beau St., Washington
WAYNE COUNTY

Louis A. Fine

----

Honesdale

WESTMORELAND COUNTY

Robert J. Key
--Mellon Bank Bldg., New Kensington
Kradel & Weppelman -.............- __511 Mellon Bank Bldg., Latrobe
John F. Kradel
Robert R. Weppelman
Thomas A. Himler, Jr.
Ned J. Nakles
1714 Lincoln Ave., Latrobe
YORK COUNTY

Alexander & Alexander
---------------46 S. Duke St.,
Bergdoll, Morton & Noll ---............------------ 54 S. Beaver St.,
T. Frederick Feldman ----------- 33 N. Queen St., York
William F. Hoffmeyer
_-32 N. George St.,
Smith & McCleary
-------------- 124 E. Market St., York
Harry C. Stitt, Jr................................... 1533 W . M arket St.,
Eveler, Pickett & Trout ..........................- 101 So. Duke St.,
Markowitz, Kagen & Griffith ------------------141 E. Market St.,

York
York
17403
York
17401
York
York
York

CALIFORNIA
Joseph Nadel, Office of Chief Counsel,
Internal Revenue Service ------- 447 Sutter St., San Francisco

CONNECTICUT
Daniel E. Brennan, Jr. ------------------

Security Bldg., Bridgeport

DELAWARE
John B. Bowman-----------Farmers Bank Bldg., Wilmington
W. Reese Hitchens -------701 Bank of Delaware Bldg., Wilmington
Alfred M. Isaacs -----287 Delaware Trust Bldg., Wilmington 19803
Allmond & Wood -----------621 Wilmington Trust Bldg., Wilmington
H. L. Williams ---------701 Bank of Delaware Bldg., Wilmington
Keil & Keil--------------200 West Ninth St., Wilmington
Douglas W. Troll - ------Suite 600-200 W. 9th St., Wilmington

PATRONS OF DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
FLORIDA
Maguire, Voorhis & Wells
135 Wall St., Orlando
D. Lloyd Zook -..---....-....--.-............. 810 Biscayne Bldg,, Miami
MARYLAND
Edward L. Carey

---

11108 Ardwick Drive, Rockville
MICHIGAN

William E. Buffalino

-

.--79 Weber Place, Detroit

NEW JERSEY
John B. Baratta --------Guarantee Trust Bldg., Atlantic City
Leonard R. Blumberg ..
203 S. Main St. Manville
Albert L. Bohl, Esq . ......................
140 Market Street, Patterson
Sidney W. Bookbinder
513 High St., Burlington
Neil F. Deighan, Jr.................. 130 W. Broadway St., Camden
Alexander Denbo 436 High St., Burlington
Drozin, Warshaw, Auerbach & Rudnick -.................
-...--.....-.-...-.-.-.---------------..
25 Reckless Place, Red Bank, N.J.
Gorson, Lazarow & Aron --------------------- 1 S. South Carolina Ave.,
Atlantic City 08404
Harth & Enright
-------------72 Burrough Pl., Bloomfield
David L. Horuvitz
136 West Broad St., Bridgeton
H. Albert Hyett
-------------- 1421 Atlantic Ave., Atlantic City
C. Raymond Kears
-Egg Harbor City
Elwood F. Kirkman -----------------------404 Broadwalk Nat'l Bank Bldg.,
Atlantic City
Lloyd, Megargee & Steedle - 1421 Atlantic Avenue, Atlantic City
Mattson, Madden, Polito & Loprete ------------744 Broad St., Newark
Kirkman, Mulligan, Bell &Armstrong
1301 Atlantic Ave., Atlantic City
Levinson, Conover, Fink & Axelrod ------- 265 Hobart St., Perth
Amboy, N.J. 08861 & 911 State Highway Route 33,
Hamilton Square, Trenton, N.J.
Jacob Levinson
Alfred A. Levinson
Richard J. Levinson
George H. Conover, Jr.
Harold J. Fink
Robert J. Axelrod
Lipman, Antonelli, Batt & Dunlap -------110 N. Sixth St., Vineland
French B. Loveland -----National Bank Bldg., Ocean City
Joseph Narrow --....----------------.............
----------67 Market St., Salem
New Jersey Dickinson School of Law Alumni Club
........
A....Atlantic City, New Jersey
Hon. Samuel P. Orlando
111 Upland Way, Haddonfield

PATRONS OF DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
---..20 Franklin St., Bridgeton
Samuel J. Serata -------............----Anchor Savings Bldg., 1537 Atlantic Ave.,
Milton M. Singer ------Atlantic City
Shapiro, Brotman, Eisenstat & Capizola ....- 1179 E. Landis Ave.,
Vineland
John Houghton Stockel -.....---- ------ 174 Smith St., Perth Amboy
NEW MEXICO
Roy F. Miller, Jr. ------ Suite 1030, National Bldg., 505 Marquette,
N.W., Albuquerque
NEW YORK
1565 Franklin Ave., Mineola, N.Y. 11501
Jack M. Steingart -----------227 Park Ave., New York, N.Y.
Ethelbert Warfield
VIRGINIA
214 Midtown Bldg., Norfolk

Vincent A. Bertolini

WASHINGTON, D. C.
Earl H. Davis

-------

Manuel J. Davis--- ---

Federal Bar Bldg., 1815 H. St., N.W.,
Washington
------- 1025 Vermont Ave. N.W. # 400,
Washington 20005

